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Abstract  
 
Title: Corporate Governance: Growth and Investment. A Case of Selected Central and Eastern 
European Countries 
Date:  June 2014 
Course:  BUSP69 Degree Project II in Finance 
Supervisor:  Göran Anderson 
Key words:  Corporate, Finance, OLS, Econometrics, CEE, GDP, Investment, Corporate governance 
indicators, Privatization, Agency Theory, effectiveness, extensiveness 
Purpose:  The main purpose of this paper is to eliminate the gap between theory and practice about 
corporate governance in selected countries in Eastern and Central Europe, which have 
transitioned from a socialist to a market economy. 
Method: We collect the necessary data for 28 European Countries from the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Countries are then grouped into 4 regions. 
Using OLS regressions two hypotheses are being tested, where “investment levels” is the 
explanatory variable for the first hypothesis, and “GDP growth” for the second one. Each 
hypothesis consists of two regressions, one representing the “corporate governance 
index” and the other “corporate governance indicators”.  
Conclusions:  The main finding of this paper is that corporate governance is negatively correlated to 
investment levels and GDP in the selected countries. The remaining independent 
variables in the regressions show statistically significant correlations as suggested by 
other papers and theory. The inefficiency of corporate governance and weak law 
institutions might be the main drivers of the underlying result. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Governance as a concept  
Before getting into more detail regarding the underlying topic the term governance should be 
elaborated first. Governance had existed as long as any modality of human organization existed. 
The term can be related to the means by which the corporation runs itself. Recently, however, the 
term has been exposed to public scrutiny because of the many issues of governance both on a 
national, and corporate level (Crowther & Aras, 2013). These problems sparked concerns about 
what really represents good governance. The World Bank (1991, p.1) defined governance as: 
"the exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society’s 
problems and affairs". Governance is thus a top down process which enables a society (or a firm) 
to accept leadership and make certain decisions that would not be made in the first place. Usually 
the power is used dictatorially, or in a certain way that most members of the entity in question do 
not approve of. This "consensual form" is present in many organizations, from local clubs to a 
nation-state level. The overall effect is that the governance is decided according to power 
structures, which usually are not always in line with the interests of the less powerful.  
1.2 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance has been gaining momentum ever since the mid '80s. Its beginnings can be 
related to the Anglo-American codes of good corporate governance which represented a 
benchmark at the time. Developing countries as well as western economies established an 
adapted version of these codes for their own firms. This kind of self-regulation had been very 
popular and ultimately was chosen above a predefined set of legal standards (Van den Barghe, 
2001). Following steep recessions and corporate improprieties, corporate governance has become 
of vital importance to most firms, mostly because investors' protection has become a very 
important problem. The main demand of the owners was that firms must implement strict 
corporate governance fundamentals so that higher returns are achieved and agency costs reduced. 
As a matter of fact, most investors are ready to pay more for firms to have good governance 
principles, hence the firm's corporate governance report is one of the most important means for 
investor's decisions (Crowther & Aras, 2013). Even though corporate governance standards have 
always been imperative for getting good rating marks for big and publicly-traded companies, 
6 
 
they are now becoming much more relevant for all the relevant stakeholders. Bottom line is that 
companies cannot and must not ignore the demand for good corporate governance from 
shareholders, potential investors and other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance can be considered as a body of moral values, ethics and trust - as an effort 
of synergy of all the members of society including the government, the public, corporations i.e. 
the stakeholders. Corporate governance is a famous topic mostly because of the consequences 
after certain corporate governance mechanisms have been used. This represents a very complex 
issue which cannot be fully understood without taking geographical and cultural factors into 
account in order to grasp the differences and similarities in corporations in various parts of the 
world.  
Corporate governance lies in the very core of the way companies are run. Oftentimes defined as 
"the way businesses are directed and controlled", it contemplates the work and activities of the 
board - as the subject that bears all the responsibility for the firm (Casson, 2013). As a broad 
term, corporate governance is a famous area of research, catching the interest of many 
economists and practitioners over the past couple of years. Yet, the term is somewhat unclear, as 
the name only grasps the process of regulating companies and does not clearly point out who is 
governing whom (Frederiksen & Jessen, 2006). Shleifer and Vishny present a definition of 
corporate governance that is simple and yet manages to capture the essence of the term: 
"Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return in their investment.” 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 737) 
Even though corporate governance causes a mixed reaction amongst economists whether it could 
positively impact firm's performance, it sure does affect the company's strategy (Crowther, 
2009). Furthermore, some research results emphasize that the quality of the corporate 
governance system of an economy might be a critical determinant of its competitive position 
(Fulghieri and Suominen, 2005). Corporate governance is mainly concerned with building a 
balance between the economic and social objectives of a firm, and including different aspects 
such as effectiveness and efficiency of resource utilization, accountability toward its 
stakeholders, and the conduct of the company in the social environment. 
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The main need for corporate governance stems from the segregation of the ownership from the 
control (management) of the company. According to classical and neo-classical economic 
theories there is not such conflict when the owner is at the same time the manager (Smith, 1776; 
Menger, 1871). In this specific case, when the investor is the manager, he does not only act in his 
interest, but also the interest of the firm. Thus, in order to get the maximum return on personal 
investments, each owner designs his unique and optimal governance structure (Ahmed, 2009). 
The main problem emerges in publicly owned firms where the investors of capital have limited 
power over the corporate decision making (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The owners in the 
publicly held firms have either little or no say in the corporate decision making process. Not 
being able to influence the managers' decisions directly, they either trust them or create a 
corporate governance device i.e. mechanism, to ensure the optimal choices had been made. The 
core of corporate governance literature is precisely those mechanisms, or devices, which ensure 
both owners and fund suppliers that profitable business activities for the return on their 
investments have been undertaken (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
1.3 Eastern Europe and Corporate Governance 
Because of the limited corporate governance codes and historical background, the majority of 
Eastern European countries have concentrated corporate ownership structures (La Porta et al., 
1999). The ownership of publicly held companies usually belongs to the large shareholders. 
Pajuste (2003) claims that the median voting rights held by the largest investor in 9 Eastern 
European countries is 44%. The median voting rights of the largest investor is highest in 
Romania with 53%, and lowest in Slovenia with 23.7%. There is not much difference upon 
comparing the ownership concentration in Eastern and Western European economies, as many 
Western countries have a higher or similar percentage of voting rights. Faccio and Lang (2002) 
research the ownership concentration and voting power held by the largest owner in the 
respective countries. The median voting rights held by the largest owner range from 16% in 
Ireland to 54% in Austria, with Scandinavian economies being somewhere in between. The high 
degree of ownership concentration in Eastern Europe affects the relationship and contracting 
between principal (shareholders) and agent (managers). Usually, in highly concentrated 
ownership environments there is a conflict that initially starts as a disagreement between the 
outside shareholders and managers. This relationship finally transforms into a conflict between 
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minority shareholders and the controlling owner. A research by Stulz (2005) and Doidge et al. 
(2007) point out that companies outside the US are actually controlled by large shareholders who 
ultimately strive to private benefits from the companies they control. Studies by Johnson et al. 
(2000), Lombardo & Pagano (2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Durnev and Kim (2005), 
Stulz (2005) assume that the costs of seeking private benefits are higher in economies where the 
law and corporate transparency are higher. Many of the countries in Eastern Europe have low 
corporate transparency rankings and disclosure clarity relatively to Western Economies and 
Scandinavia, according to Standard and Poor's disclosure ranking and Transparency 
International's Corruption Perception index (2013). 
1.4 Problem Statement  
Are higher levels of corporate governance positively correlated with GDP growth and investment 
levels in Eastern and Central European countries? Corporate governance in Eastern and Central 
Europe has been exposed to intensive scrutiny and research activities over the last decade, 
including papers by: Haiss P.R and Fink G. (“Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Transition management is a tough job”, 1998), Miclaus P. G. (“Corporate Governance: a 
South-Eastern European perspective”, 2007), Vliegenthart A. ("Corporate Governance in Eastern 
Central Europe: The State of the Art", 2004), among others. 
The core of our paper can easily be connected to the famous "Washington Consensus" where 
"privatization, liberalization and macroeconomic stability" (Aggestam, Falck, 2000)
 
were the 
pillars of any modern country. Even though the consensus was originally intended for Latin 
American countries, these ground rules were perceived as a general recipe for evolution for 
developing countries including our sample of selected countries. The demise of the Washington 
Consensus can easily be associated with some crucial events from the 1990's such as: transition 
crisis in Central and Eastern Europe, the limited growth in Africa and the Asian financial crisis. 
Nowadays the majority of economists suggest a broader set of instruments and objectives for 
insuring smooth transition to a market based economy (Franzini, 2009). 
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1.5 Purpose 
The main purpose of this paper is to eliminate the gap between theory and practice about 
corporate governance in selected countries in Eastern and Central Europe, which have 
transitioned from a socialist to a market economy. Furthermore, the secondary purpose is to 
determine the concrete effect of corporate governance mechanisms on a country’s growth level 
and investment. 
1.6 Limitations 
A possible limitation of this paper is the selected time period. Because the data for all the 
variables was not available beyond the selected years, a larger time frame could improve the 
accuracy of the research. Another potential drawback is the fact that the independent variables 
used to perform regressions are collected from a survey from 2007 which implies that the data is 
not time-varying. This could also have a slight impact on the findings. Finally an extension of the 
model incorporating additional factors such as ownership structure could possibly better capture 
and explain the link between investment, GDP growth, and corporate governance.  
1.7 Target group 
This thesis is specifically written for students with a background in economics and corporate 
finance, researchers, professors and other subjects interested in corporate finance, econometrics 
and time series analysis. Furthermore, this paper might be of special interest to those familiar 
with the economies in Eastern and Central Europe, or emerging markets in general. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
In order to understand what drives corporate governance the reader should be introduced to some 
fundamental notions that characterize corporate governance mechanisms and principles. It 
should be mentioned that this chapter will discuss the application of corporate governance from a 
theoretical perspective. Furthermore the chapter will be structured as follows: corporate 
governance will be discussed from a general perspective which is not necessarily specific for 
CEE countries. Here some examples including mechanisms in developed countries will be given. 
The following section focuses on corporate governance in CEE countries specifically. Finally the 
remainder of the chapter discusses agency problems which are a reoccurring issue for corporate 
governance in general and even more so in developing countries.   
2.1 Corporate governance in theory and practice   
The notion that corporate governance is a determinant of growth is in fact in line with classic 
economic theory. According to the economist Jean Tirole (2001): "the standard definition of 
corporate governance among economists and legal scholars refers to the defense of shareholder 
interest". Corporate governance is the usual response to agency problems between owners and 
managers of companies, who oftentimes have conflicting interests. With lack of constraints 
managers have no real incentive to return any of the profits to the investors ex post. Of course, 
this triggers the problem of securing funds ex ante: no one will be willing to invest their money 
to a project when they know their capital will be misused. 
2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
2.2.1   Board of Directors 
The board of directors is composed of executive and nonexecutive directors which are elected by 
the company’s shareholders to monitor and control top management. Hart (1995) argues that 
although in theory the board of directors has an essential role, reality suggests that it does not 
always serve in the best interest of the company. An obvious reason is the difficulty of the 
executive directors to act as supervisors for themselves. When it comes to the other members of 
the board which are outsiders, they often lack financial interest in the company and therefore are 
not really affected by the affairs or performance of the firm (Hart, 1995). Hart (1995) states that 
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nonexecutive directors are likely to be on the board of other companies as well which disables 
them to become significantly involved in the company’s activities. Also they have a sense of 
loyalty towards the management which elected them and want to maintain a good relationship 
with these in order to get reelected.  
2.1.1. Proxy Fights 
As previously mentioned, the board of directors does not always fulfill its job requirements 
leaving the shareholders unsatisfied with their activity. In such cases the shareholders can decide 
to replace the current board with a new one through a proxy fight. This process consists of one or 
more shareholders, known as the dissidents, who are willing to start the proxy fight (Dodd & 
Warner, 1982). They select a set of candidates to run for the board and then convince the other 
shareholders to vote for it. Proxy fights are not always beneficial for companies where the 
ownership is too diffused and the costs of initiating the election and getting the shareholders on 
board are high (Hart, 1995). Dodd and Warner (1982) discuss that during a specific period after 
the announcement of the contest is made public, companies experience negative returns. On the 
other hand there is a positive impact on the performance of the share price during the election.    
2.2.2 Large Shareholders 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (2012), concentrated ownership is a common modality to 
assure that the outside investors will have their rights protected. This means that minority 
shareholders, whether they are one or more, have stakes of ten to twenty percent in the company 
which gives them enough power to monitor the firm’s management. This makes it possible for 
some usual problems such as free riding, to be avoided. By having large ownership stakes, 
minority shareholders are generally interested in higher profits and therefore in their 
maximization which covers another issue i.e. agency problems.  
In Europe, the characteristics of minority ownership are different for every country. In the case 
of Germany, around one fourth of the votes in major firms are controlled by large banks. On the 
other hand the ownership structure in small firms is characterizes by pyramids as these are 
typically family owned. Therefore it is likely that the control will be concentrated in the hands of 
the owner himself (Franks & Mayer, 1994). Pyramids arise when two or more firms are being 
controlled by the same individual, usually the owner (Barca & Trento, 1997). According to 
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Barca and Trento (1997), because minority shareholders have dispersed voting rights across the 
chain of companies, this enables the owner to gain control of the shareholders’ capital with 
minimal capital of his own. France is characterized by cross ownership which enables the voting 
rights to be diffused across the companies as opposed to them being concentrated in the hands of 
one firm or person as it happens in pyramids (Morck, 2000). In the rest of Europe (Finland, 
Sweden, Italy etc) the companies are controlled usually by their owners who in many cases also 
happen to be their founders (Shleifer & Vishny, 2012).  
Shleifer and Vishny (2012) point out that large minority ownership has a higher level of 
effectiveness in countries with stronger legal systems. As this will ensure the protection of the 
minority shareholders’ voting rights whereas in countries with less sophisticated courts, there are 
greater chances that the majority ownership will be favored.  
2.2.3 Hostile Takeovers  
The issue with the above mentioned mechanisms is the fact that the shareholders that identify the 
problem and initiate the change in the company incur large costs while gaining little back. 
Hostile takeovers on the other hand are mechanisms with a lot more power, as the benefit for 
those who detect the underperforming firm, are much more significant (Hart, 1995).  The targets 
are companies in which the board of directors fails to monitor and control the management and 
thus agency and free rider problems arise. In other words the internal governance mechanism is 
inefficient (Shivdasani, 1992).  
2.2.4 Financial Structure 
Unlike the above mentioned mechanisms, this method disciplines the management not through 
voting or monitoring but through the financial structure of the company (Hart, 2005). Debt is one 
of the means that will stop management to reinvest the company’s profit irresponsibly. The 
amount of debt signals a certain level of commitment and creditability against the managements’ 
opportunistic behavior. Nevertheless debt will act as a discipline method only when it is 
followed by an appropriate punishment such as a bankruptcy procedure, in the occurrence of 
default. For example Chapter 11 is a default mechanism that may have the opposite effect on the 
management giving it fewer incentives to avoid bankruptcy (Hart, 2005).  
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2.3 Privatization 
Scholars such as Johnson and Shleifer (2004) discuss the potential drawbacks of privatization 
and the necessary measures that have to complement it, such as encouraging competition. This 
entails a different set of political initiatives. Johnson and Shleifer (2004) discuss that a key 
source that distinguishes countries is their underlying law system. More specifically European 
countries are characterized by civil law which naturally assumes less protection of minority 
shareholders. Therefore the benefits of privatization are not fully exploited as lack of minority 
protection causes agency problems and expropriation. As a result, such countries have less 
outside investment and larger debt-to-equity ratios which makes them more susceptible to 
collapse (Friedman, Johnson & Mitton, 2003). There are certain mechanisms that private 
companies have developed in civil law countries, that help them with external investors, however 
these mechanisms are not even close to perfection as there still remain a number of loopholes 
that management use in their own interest (Johnson, La Porta et al., 2000).   
2.4 Corporate Governance Mechanisms in CEE  
According to Lupu (2008) the starting point of the transition differed significantly between the 
CEE countries since their financial and economic situations were not alike. This in turn 
translated onto the transition taking different patterns of development, at times resulting in 
financial crises for some countries. Nevertheless despite the different trajectories, with time these 
countries built economic systems that exhibit a mixture of capitalism that is found in Continental 
Europe and characterized by large shareholders and parts of capitalism that have an 
entrepreneurial focus, specific for the US.  
Lupu (2008) argues that transition led to an unexpected result in the form of new types of 
governance. Privatization was common for all CEE countries however transferring ownership 
was not enough to generate proper incentives for managers. The problem of conflict of interest 
still remains as managers often abuse of their status in order to benefit themselves neglecting 
how this may affect the company. Therefore the enforcement of corporate governance 
mechanisms is needed.  
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Table 2. 4: Corporate Governance Mechanisms in CEE (Source Berglöf & Pajuste, 2005) 
Corporate Governance 
Mechanism 
Importance in CEE Possibility for Policy Intervention 
Large Shareholders 
(block-holders) 
Considered very important mechanism; 
as a result there is 
concentrated ownership 
Reinforce laws that protect minority 
shareholders whilst maintaining the incentive 
to hold controlling blocks 
Market for Corporate 
Control 
Not important when there is concentrated 
ownership 
Control and ownership disclosure and 
transparency; improve banking system 
Proxy Fights 
Small chances of being effective 
because the ownership is concentrated 
Better communication between shareholders 
through more advanced technology; Control 
and ownership disclosure and transparency 
Activity of the Board 
Not likely to have a significant impact 
because the owner controls the board 
and can fire or hire its members 
Voting transparency; introduce cumulative 
voting; train the board of directors; 
Executive 
Compensation 
Not that important, owner can act in his 
own interests, can fire or hire 
Compensation system should be disclosed, 
introduction of laws dealing with conflicts of 
interest 
Shareholder activism 
Possibly important for companies with 
diffused shareholders 
Boost communication and contact between 
the shareholders; increase minority 
shareholder protection 
Monitoring of the Bank 
Important however dependent on how 
healthy the banking system is 
Stronger regulations for the banking system; 
introduce credit agencies 
Monitoring of the 
Employees 
Possibly important especially for small 
firms with highly skilled employees 
Information should be disclosed to 
employees; potentially have a representative 
in the board 
Litigation 
High dependence on the efficiency of the 
enforcement environment 
Enable communication between 
shareholders, introduce class action suits 
Social and Media 
Control 
Possibly important however dependent 
on how independent the media and the 
level of competition 
Diversify media control; more competition 
and public campaigns 
Mechanisms of 
Bilateral Private 
Enforcement 
Important however can have 
disadvantages for outsiders 
Encourage better commercial and civil 
courts 
Multilateral 
Mechanisms (Auditors, 
arbitration) 
Possibly important but the audits are not 
always fair, there can be conflicts of 
interest and the problem with 
enforcement still persists 
Enable the development of mechanisms for 
private third parties 
 
Table 2.4 is an overview of the different corporate governance mechanisms that can be applied in 
CEE countries (Berglöf & Pajuste, 2005). How efficient these mechanisms are, is dependent on 
the type of and how well certain institutions operate in a specific country.  For example, Coffee 
(1999) states that there is evidence showing that during bad economic and financial times the 
level of expropriation increases. Simply put, managers are more likely to conduct activities that 
will ultimately affect their personal benefits in troubling times. For this reason Coffee (1999) 
argues that countries with stronger legal systems that protect the rights of minority shareholders 
are less affected by a negative shock to the economy. Thus failure of the institutions to function 
appropriately serves as an impediment to the development of good corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
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2.5 Corporate Governance Principles in CEE 
So far this paper has discussed the different aspects of corporate governance mechanisms in a 
general setting as well as more specifically for CEE countries. However the success of 
implementing corporate governance mechanisms, as Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) state, is highly 
dependent on how well institutions function. Golebiowska-Tataj and Klonowski (2009), add 
more elements to the theory discussed so far by introducing a set of five principles that aid 
countries in transition to establish better corporate governance mechanisms.  
The first principle deals with financial control and the right of the management and shareholders 
to be aware of the company’s real financial situation. This usually involves a third party, such as 
an auditing firm, which confirms whether inside financial reporting is reliable or not (Melis, 
2004). The challenge for the CEE countries is to avoid the unofficial economy that is created 
through entrepreneurs who go against paying taxes. Such entrepreneurs rely on non-
governmental agencies for protection, whose activity is deemed as illegal and corrupt. The 
companies that form around such unofficial sectors are not transparent in their earnings. As a 
result proper financial control is not established, violating one of the principles of corporate 
governance (Johnson, Kaufmann & Shleifer, 1997). According to Golebiowska-Tataj and 
Klonowski (2009) another key principle is conflict resolution, as prolonged misunderstanding 
and clashes between managers and the shareholders leads to agency problems and thus may 
negatively affect the company in the long-run. Furthermore the next principle focuses on 
utilizing corporate governance in order to improve company performance. Scholars such as 
Cremers and Nair (2005), establish that there is a definite link between corporate governance and 
the profitability of a firm. The next assumption states that corporate governance helps the 
strategies to be implemented in such a way that results in increased returns and thus creates value 
for the financial shareholder in particular. The final principle assumes that corporate governance 
practices can be transferred. According to Bris, Brisley and Cabolis (2008) shareholders with 
large corporate governance experience have a positive impact on the companies they partake in. 
This makes it possible to transfer corporate governance principles between companies or 
countries. 
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2.6 Agency Theory 
The main task of corporate governance is to deal with the agency problem generated from 
contractual arrangements among factors of production (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). According to 
the agency theory elaborated by Coase (1937) and farther explained by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), a company is a legal entity that serves as a core for various sets of contracts between 
divergent parties. The underlying relationship works in such a way that the principal appoints 
another agent to conduct some services on his behalf, which usually involves assigning some 
decision making authority to the agent. The principal is interested in spending the funds in a 
certain way, and as such tries to stop any financial improprieties regarding expropriation and 
negative NPV projects that can be undertaken by the manager. This problem is known as the 
agency problem between principal and agent. The separation of ownership and control is a 
lucrative on-going debate among economists. A conflict of interest always arises when the 
ownership and control are not aligned. Ideally, the owner and the manager would sign a 
"complete contract" which foresees every future state of the world and establishes corresponding 
actions under each. However, this requirement of prediction of all the future states is "technically 
infeasible", and thus the underlying contract unattainable. Another reason which necessitates the 
use of incomplete contracts is the asymmetric information (Frederiksen & Jessen, 2006). 
Asymmetric information concerns the fact that owners and managers do not possess the same 
information, i.e. managers usually know a lot more about the projects and funds compared to the 
owners, because it is almost impossible for the owners to monitor each action of the manager. 
The costly, almost impossible perfect contracts along with the conflicts of interest and inefficient 
controlling of managers, eventually reduces the value of the company, thus incomplete contracts 
must be used instead. Due to the incompleteness of the contracts agency problems may arise. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency cost as "the sum of the monitoring expenditures 
by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss", where the residual 
loss refers to "the dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal as a 
result of divergence between the agent’s decision and the ones maximizing the principal’s 
welfare” (p. 308). 
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2.6.1 The agency problem between owner and manager  
Agency problems exist between various subjects, however the most discussed ones in the 
literature are those agency costs caused by separation of ownership and control. This separation 
is specifically important in modern companies with diffused ownership structures. There are a 
few reasons for this inference. First, within a developed capital market the investors (owners) are 
able to easily alter their investments from one firm to another with relatively low costs (Fama, 
1980). This goes in line with the portfolio theory, which suggests that the more investors 
diversify their portfolio the less interested they are in singular firm's activities (Li, 2010). On the 
other hand, agents who have relevant monitoring and managing skills are willing to rent out their 
human capital to companies for a certain fee, which depends on the company's performance. 
Furthermore, shareholders with diversified portfolios are either disinterested or not qualified for 
managing and controlling, and are ready to delegate their management control to other agents 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Even though the ownership theory claims that the owners should have the final say and make 
decisions, they are not able to so because of under-qualification and lack of necessary managing 
skills. Hence, the majority of residual rights are held by the managers and it’s ultimately them 
who allocate the resources to their own liking. This ignites the expropriation problem which can 
take various forms. Vishny (1997) indicates that in countries where investors are not well 
protected, like in Eastern Europe, the expropriation takes on direct forms such as cashing out or 
transfer pricing. In the Western economies on the other hand, such as the US, the expropriation 
of funds by managers is of a more subtle form, using indirect approaches. A unique way of 
expropriation worth mentioning is the management entrenchment, where the managers secure 
their position at a high level of compensation, even though they might not be fully qualified for 
the underlying position (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). 
2.6.2 Mitigating the agency problem  
In order to eliminate or minimize the divergences between the interests of owners and managers, 
the owners need to initiate incentive contracts for the managers and effective monitoring system 
within the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The incentive contracts are perceived as instruments 
used to align the interests of the managers and owners and can take various forms such as: 
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dismissal threats (when a firm’s performance is lower than a certain benchmark), stock options 
and equity ownership. Monitoring on the other hand, is another remedy for the agency problem 
that can be used beside the incentive contracts. According to Fama & Jensen (1983), when 
controlling and ownership are separated, a monitoring system which is independent from 
management ought to be established in order to eliminate the agency problem.  
Monitoring can be elaborated from two different perspectives. When ownership is concentrated 
in a few residual claimants, decision control should belong to the large shareholders for 
“ratifying and monitoring important decisions and setting rewards” (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
These large shareholders have the power to reduce the agency problem because they have 
enough control power to affect the strategies and decisions of the company, while being equally 
interested in profit maximization (as the shareholders’ main incentive). In contrast, when 
ownership belongs to many diffused subjects it is impractical and impossible for every claimant 
to have a say in the decision-making process of the corporation. As mentioned before, this is 
mostly due to the lack of competency and disinterest of the diversified shareholders, who are 
thus willing to mitigate their decision-making power to competent managers such as the board of 
directors (Fama, 1980). The board of directors is a prevailing organizational form within the 
decision control system with the authority to hire, fire, set compensation schemes and control 
important firm decisions (Li, 2010). Monitoring can also take other forms, like “decision 
hierarchies”, where the senior level managers are responsible for monitoring the subordinate 
managers; and “mutual monitoring system” where all agents monitor each other because the 
rental rate for their human capital is dependent on the company’s performance.  
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3. Method 
3.1 Panel Data 
Observations in panel data involve at least two elements; a time-series and a cross sectional 
dimension. (Hsiao, 2006). Simply put, a panel data is a data set in which the behavior of some 
subjects are observed across time. These entities could be companies, individuals, or as in our 
case - states. With panel data one can include variables at different levels of analysis suitable for 
hierarchical or multi-level modeling. Panel data have several advantages over time-series or 
cross-sectional data. To begin with, panel data provides more accurate inferences of the model's 
parameters, as it contains more degrees of freedom and a richer sample variability. There is also 
a greater scope of capturing complex entity behavior. However, probably the biggest advantage 
of using panel data is that a lot of issues can be addressed and it is also possible to work out more 
complex problems. (Brooks, 2008; Verbeek, 2012). Certain drawbacks might be data collection 
problems, non-responsiveness (micro panels) or cross-state dependency in the macro panel 
scenario (Reyna, 2010). The more serious challenge of panel methodology is to control the effect 
of unobserved heterogeneity, as well as, obtain valid conclusions on the structural parameters. 
3.1.1 Fixed and random effects 
For financial research there are two main models that can be applied; the fixed-effects model and 
the random effects model. Each model contains different properties depending on decomposition 
of certain variables or proposing different intercepts for each entity. Below, these models are 
explained more in depth. 
3.1.1.1 Fixed effects 
The fixed effects model breaks down the error term into an entity specific impact and a 
remainder error term that varies over time. Simply, the fixed effects can be used whenever one is 
only interested in analyzing the effect of variables that vary over time (Brooks, 2008; Berbeek, 
2012). The fixed effects model explores the relation between predictor and outcome variables 
within an entity, such as one country. Each country has its own individual properties that might 
or might not influence the predictor variables. In this scenario, it can be assumed that something 
within the entity (country) may influence the outcome variables and one needs to control for this. 
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This can be connected to the rationale or assumption that there is correlation between the entity's 
error term and outcome variables. The fixed effects remove the impact of those time non-varying 
properties from the predictor variables, thus the predictor's net effect can be assessed. Probably 
the most important assumption of the underlying model is that the time-invariant properties are 
unique to the country and should not be correlated with other entity's characteristics. Each 
country is different, so the error term and constant should not be correlated with the others. The 
equation that needs to be estimated is as follows (Brooks, 2008; Berbeek, 2012): 
it it i ity x         (2) 
Besides the entity-fixed-effects model, the time-fixed-effects model can also be used. Now the 
error term can be broken down into a time-specific effect and a remainder error: 
it it i ity x         (3) 
A combination of the previous two can also be made, where we allow for both time-specific and 
entity-specific effects within the same model. In this case, the error term is decomposed into 
three parts: time-specific effect, entity-specific effect and a remainder term. (Equation 4) 
it it i i ity x           (4) 
To sum up, the fixed-effects models are designed to study the causes of changes within an entity. 
A time-invariant property cannot cause such a change, because it is non-varying for each entity 
(Reyna, 2010).  
3.1.1.2 Random effects 
The motivation behind random effects model is that, unlike the fixed effects model, the diversity 
across entities is presumed to be random and uncorrelated with the independent variables in the 
underlying model. Greene (2008) further motivates that the main difference between fixed and 
random effects models is whether the unobserved individual effect incorporates elements that are 
correlated with the explanatory variables in the model, not if these effects are stochastic or not. 
Unlike the fixed effects model where the invariant variables are absorbed by the intercept, an 
advantage of the random effects model is that invariant variables can now be included in the 
model. 
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The following equation represents the core of the random effects model: 
* * * *
it it ity x u       (5) 
   where  
*
it i
*
*
iit
*
iit
(y y )
(1 )
( )
( )
it
it
it
y
x x x
u u u
 
 
 
 
 
 
   and     
2 2
1 v
vT 

 
  

 
The transformation is required so that there is no remaining correlation in the error terms 
(Brooks, 2008). In general, the random effects model is expected to be more efficient than the 
fixed effects model because less parameters have to be estimated, thus degrees of freedom are 
saved. On the other hand, in this model there are stricter assumptions that have to be satisfied, 
i.e. the model is only valid when the composite error term is uncorrelated with all the controlled 
variables. 
3.1.2 The Hausman Test 
In order to determine whether fixed or random effects should be used, a Hausman test should be 
run which will indicate what method is more appropriate for the given model. After running the 
test in EViews, if the significance of the p-value indicates that the unobserved effects and the 
independent variables are unlikely to be uncorrelated and consequently leads to the rejection of 
the null hypothesis. On the other hand, a p-value that is not significant at 5% supports the idea of 
uncorrelation. Since the random effects model is based on the assumption that the errors are 
uncorrelated with the effects, in a Hausman test failure to reject the null hypothesis means that 
random effects should be utilized while the opposite suggests that fixed effects are more 
appropriate.  
The Hausman test statistic:  
Consider two estimators,  ̂  and  ̂ .  
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H0: Both estimators are consistent but only  ̂  is efficient. 
H1: Only  ̂  is consistent. 
   ̂    ̂   ̂  
  ̂        
Where:  ̂  and  ̂ are estimates of the covariance matrices of   ̂  and  ̂  and q=  ̂  -  ̂ . 
3.1.3 Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity 
Because panel datasets have a time series cross-section nature, it is likely that the data can suffer 
from autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. In order to test for autocorrelation in a panel data, 
the provided Durbin-Watson statistic by EViews can be utilized. This value is computed by 
utilizing a stacked set of residuals on which the first order residual correlation is calculated. The 
Durbin Watson statistic takes values from zero to four. A value of two or close, indicates no or 
almost no autocorrelation. Values much smaller or higher than two suggest positive and negative 
autocorrelation respectively. If autocorrelation is detected, it can be corrected by lagging the 
dependent variable by one period and performing the test again in order to assess any changes in 
the Durbin Watson value.  
When it comes to heteroskedasticity, having such a problem can cause invalid inferences from 
regressions and statistically insignificant results. Unfortunately it is not possible to utilize 
heteroskedasticity tests in EViews when dealing with panel data however in order to account for 
this issue the white cross-section coefficient covariance matrix can be used. 
3.2 Testing hypotheses 
The main implication from economic literature is that corporate governance affects economic 
growth and investment levels (Fanzini, 2009). It is argued that agency costs which come from 
the separation of ownership and control will decrease with more extensive corporate governance. 
As a result, the returns of investments will go up, since less surplus will be taken by the 
managers. Furthermore, the availability of funds will increase and cost of outside financing will 
decrease, since investors will be more willing to supply financing. Finally, the aggregate 
investment will increase as there is a higher supply of outside financing.  
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The implication of theory results in two hypotheses that can be tested: 
Hypothesis 1: 
H0: Higher corporate governance levels will increase the aggregate level of investment  
Hypothesis 2: 
H0: Higher corporate governance levels will increase growth rates 
Note: Higher corporate governance levels refers to extensive corporate governance regulations 
achieved by utilizing the mechanisms of corporate governance elaborated before. 
The hypotheses are tested using a sample of 28 Eastern and Central European countries that 
started the transition process to a market system in the beginning of the 1990's. There are a 
couple of reasons why we were particularly interested in these countries. As developing 
economies undergoing a rapid transition, there had been a lot of variations as to which reforms 
have been successful across the region. The geographic closeness and a shared communism 
history allow to aggregate perplexing factors which otherwise would be difficult to quantify. 
Lastly, after the fall of communism in 1989, all of the underlying countries began the process of 
restructuring around the same time.  
The Eastern and Central European countries in the sample are: Macedonia, Moldova, Georgia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Estonia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan. These countries can be grouped into 4 regions: Balkans, CEE, Baltics and EA/A. 
The first category consists of 8 Balkan economies including the Former Yugoslav countries. 
Besides their geographic proximity, most of these countries also share a common history and 
similar economic indicators. The second group, consists of 8 countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and the reasons for this grouping is also because of the geographic closeness and the 
shared transition from a socialist to a market economy. The third region contains all the Baltic 
States, and finally Region 4 includes Russia and 8 ex-soviet countries from Eurasia and Asia. 
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Table 3. 2: Countries 
BALKANS: Macedonia Croatia Albania B&H Bulgaria Montenegro 
  Slovenia Serbia         
CEE*: Moldova Hungary Czech Republic Poland Romania  Ukraine 
  Slovakia Belarus 
 
      
BALTICS: Latvia Lithuania Estonia       
EA/A**: Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
  Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia       
 
*CEE – selected countries from Central/Eastern Europe 
**EA/A – selected ex-Soviet countries from Eurasia and Asia  
3.3 Data  
Dependent Variables 
For each hypothesis mentioned, there is one dependent variable. The data is taken from the 
database provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). For the 
first hypothesis, the level of investment is utilized (inv, taken as % of GDP), while for the second 
hypothesis the growth in real GDP is used (gdp). 
Independent Variables 
EBRD has gathered a set of corporate governance indicators which can be found in the 
Corporate Governance Legislation Assessment Project. These indicators will represent the 
independent variables used in order to carry out the regressions. This assessment was made by 
law firms that operate in the EBRD area and it comprises six main interest groups. These are the 
following:  
Group 1: making sure that there is a foundation for the corporate governance framework to be 
effective (cg1). 
Group 2: Shareholder rights (cg2). 
Group 3: the fair shareholder treatment (cg3). 
Group 4: stakeholders’ role within corporate governance (cg4). 
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Group 5: transparency and disclosure (cg5). 
Group 6: board responsibility (cg6). 
From these groups, certain questions are selected, weighted and gathered into an index specific 
for each group, which together with the rest of the indexes is then used to form another general 
index (cgindex). EBRD provides this data on their website. These six groups that are utilized to 
describe corporate governance practices in the 28 CEE countries are rather straightforward and 
incorporate the concepts discussed earlier in the paper. Generally, the first group refers to the 
legal framework that countries must possess in order to ensure effective corporate governance.  
The next two groups measure how well shareholders are protected. The fifth group examines the 
level of disclosure and transparency required by law and the last group looks at the board’s rights 
and how strong they are. The fourth group is slightly controversial because it considers 
stakeholder’s rights which include, for example, suppliers and employees. Therefore the 
maximization of shareholder value can be overshadowed by the protection of stakeholder rights.  
Two regressions are run for each individual dependent variable, employing the aggregate 
corporate governance index and the corporate governance components. The first regression 
therefore will result in determining the overall impact of corporate governance, while the second 
one captures the impact of each element of corporate governance, presented above. The data is 
however available from 2003 until 2009.  
Control Variables 
Besides the variables mentioned above, there is an additional indicator that is also collected from 
the EBRD database and it measures the effectiveness of these corporate governance components 
(cgeffec). What this entails is that a country may score high on certain corporate governance 
groups yet at the same time have a low effectiveness score which indicates that while there are 
laws protecting shareholder rights for example, their enforcement is weak. Such a control 
variable proves to be necessary since there might be gap in the legal system that will otherwise 
not be detected. The level of investment is expected to be positively correlated with corporate 
governance effectiveness.   
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Furthermore, another four control variables are used in order to examine macroeconomic 
stability, deregulation and privatization. The rate of money growth (mgr) and lending (lendr) are 
used to capture macroeconomic stability. Lower rates of money growth will be registered when 
inflation is low and according to the Washington Consensus, interest rates should be low as well. 
Price liberalization (pricelib) is the control variable utilized for deregulation while privatization 
is captured by the control variable with the same name (privatiz).   It is expected privatization 
and price liberalization to positively affect the level of investment meanwhile having an opposite 
effect on lending rate and money growth.  
The control variable for price liberalization will take values from 1 to 4.33, 1 showing that prices 
have no or little liberalization i.e. government controlled while 4.33 shows liberalization of 
prices. The rate of lending is for each country takes into account maturities and their weighted 
average. When it comes to privatization the control variable looks at the private sector and how 
much of GDP is attributed to it. Finally the change in broad money at the end of each year 
expressed in percentages is indicated by the money growth control variable.   
The next control variable contains the regions (reg) of every country. As previously mentioned, 
there are four regions that will be examined. Each region is attributed a number from one to four.  
The natural logarithm of the GDP per capita (loggdp) for each country represents another control 
variable. This variable is expected to be positively correlated with investment and growth. As 
previously discussed the origin of the legal system is a factor that has proven to explain some 
differences between corporate governance and protection of shareholder rights in various 
countries. Therefore legal origin (legor) will be the eighth variable. If the commercial law of a 
country has its origins in the French civil law then the value 0 will be attributed, otherwise if it 
originates from the German civil law, the value will be 1.  
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4. Empirical Findings and Analysis 
 
There are certain corporate governance issues in some regions and countries that have not been 
analyzed in detail (Claessens, 2003). In particular, the special corporate governance issues of 
state owned firms are not well understood, nor are the principles of enforcement. According to 
theory, better corporate governance principles benefit companies through easier access to 
financing, better company performance and lower cost of capital (Franzini, 2009). Many studies 
agree that these channels function not only at a company level, but in countries and regions as 
well - although causality is not always clear.  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
The country that has the highest GDP growth as well as investment level is Azerbaijan. On the 
other end, the lowest GDP growth and investment level also both, belonging to Lithuania. The 
descriptive statistics below show that out of all the corporate governance groups, cg4 
(stakeholders’ role within corporate governance) has the highest mean while cg6 (board 
responsibility) has the lowest mean. The highest score for this group belongs to Slovenia while 
the lowest is attributed to Tajikistan. Both of these countries belong to different regions. When it 
comes to cg6, besides the fact that it has the lowest mean it also has the lowest minimum value 
which is 0.07 and was registered by Ukraine.  
When it comes to the overall corporate governance index and efficiency, the country that has the 
highest level of corporate governance is Lithuania while efficiency-wise is has a value of 6.65 
which is above the mean and close to the maximum value. On the opposite end of Lithuania is 
Tajikistan which also happens to have the lowest efficiency value out of all countries. When it 
comes to lending rate, Georgia has the highest lending rate while Lithuania has the lowest. 
Countries such as Bulgaria, Albania and Armenia have the maximum liberalization value 
Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan score the lowest. When it comes to GDP, Slovenia 
reaches the top number while again Tajikistan has the lowest value far from the mean. When it 
comes to privatization, Georgia again has the lead while a value of only 2.6 which is very low 
belongs to Azerbaijan.    
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Table 4.1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
 Std. 
Dev. 
Dependent Variables 
GDP growth 5.371949 6.3 30.5 -18.4 6.170137 
INVESTMENT 26.2077 25.5 58 11.43 6.630386 
Explanatory Variables 
CG1 0.630694 0.647059 0.882353 0.176471 0.164493 
CG2 0.626732 0.643836 0.882353 0.176471 0.146262 
CG3 0.689223 0.714286 0.857143 0.428571 0.106734 
CG4 0.707924 0.692308 1 0.307692 0.177586 
CG5 0.601959 0.636364 0.878788 0.333333 0.172261 
CG6 0.53276 0.571429 0.821429 0.071429 0.190614 
CG_INDEX 10.64796 11.11682 13.3115 6.196666 1.941759 
EFF 5.322368 5.025 6.825 2.775 0.981453 
LENDRATE 13.72857 12.1 32.2667 5.11333 6.264045 
LGDP 8.200522 8.319496 10.20857 5.513646 1.125883 
LIBER 4.032331 4.3 4.3 2.7 0.439274 
MGROW 25.0969 22.29341 78.80869 -4.43928 16.98325 
PRIVATIZATION 14.83308 13.3 41.8 2.6 9.528702 
 
In order to see if there is any high correlation between the variable, a correlation table is 
presented in Appendices A and B. The results show that there are no reasons for concern.  
4.2 Hypothesis I 
Below are presented the regressions used for testing the first hypothesis, where the subscript “t” 
indicates a time-changing variable, while “i” denotes a changeable variable across countries.   
Regression 1: 
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Regression 2: 
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4.2.1 Findings  
As previously discussed, in order to determine if either random or fixed effects are more suitable 
for the model in this paper, a Hausman test is run. The output is presented below.  
Table 4.2.1: Hausman test (Hypothesis 1, Regression 1) 
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 8.091685 5 0.1513 
As can be seen, the p-value is not significant at 5% which leads to the inability to reject the null 
hypothesis i.e. random effects should be used in this regression. In order to check for 
autocorrelation, after the regression is run, the Durbin Watson statistic indicates a value of 1.64 
which indicates some form of positive correlation. In this case the dependent variable, 
investment, is lagged by one period and another regression is run. At the same time in order to 
account for the possible heteroskedasticity, the White cross-section coefficient covariance matrix 
is utilized. The new value of the Durbin Watson statistic suggests a much better model as it is 
2.08. The results can be seen in table 4.2.2. 
The findings suggest that the corporate governance index is significant with a p-value of 0.033 
and is also negatively correlated with investment. Thus it can be said that a one unit increase in 
the corporate governance index results in a 0.3 percent decrease in the investment level. These 
findings are consistent with those of Franzini (2009) who also finds a significant negative 
correlation between these two variables. Nevertheless such results are surprising as they 
contradict the expected outcome. According to the literature previously mentioned in the paper, 
higher levels of corporate governance should be accompanied by increased investment and not 
the opposite. Another significant control variable is corporate governance effectiveness which 
has a p-value of 0 and is positively correlated with investment. Such an outcome was expected 
and predicted by the literature. Legal origin is positively correlated with investment and it is 
significant. When it comes to privatization, the results indicate negative correlation however with 
a p-value of 0.322 which shows insignificance. This finding is contrary to that of Franzini (2009) 
who finds positive and significant correlation between privatization and investment. The next 
control variable, price liberalization displays a positive correlation with investment but an 
insignificant explanatory power with a p-value less than 0.25. The variable ln of GDP indicates 
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that an increase in the investment level results in higher GDP and has a significant p-value. Both 
of these findings are consistent with the literature. Another finding that is significant at 5% and 
in line with theory is lending rate which is negatively correlated with investment. Money growth 
on the other hand, although significant it is positively correlated with the dependent variable. The 
direction of the relationship is against what literature might predict however consistent with 
Franzini as he too finds a positive and significant correlation.  
The regression also indicates that countries from region 4 are doing worse in terms of investment 
than countries from the first region. This region has coefficients that are statistically significant 
at 5%. Regions 2 and 3 on the other hand have insignificant coefficients. Also the last variable 
denotes the lagged dependent variable.  
Table 4. 2.2: Regression results for Hypothesis 1, Regression 1 (Investment is the dep. variable). 
 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob. 
CGINDEX -0.279158 0.150625 -1.85333 0.033* 
CGEFFEC 0.631189 0.183767 3.434714 0.000* 
LEGOR 1.066295 0.29887 3.567757 0.000* 
LENDR -0.062484 0.033445 -1.86828 0.032* 
LOGDP 0.377085 0.229516 1.64296 0.052** 
PRICELIB 0.89156 1.307771 0.68174 0.249 
MGROW 0.06718 0.026372 2.54738 0.006* 
PRIVATIZ -0.030258 0.065366 -0.46289 0.322 
REG2 -0.082133 0.346724 -0.23688 0.407 
REG3 -0.01489 1.601733 -0.0093 0.496 
REG4 -2.02329 0.451353 -4.48273 0.000* 
LAGINV 0.767317 0.125577 6.110327 0.000* 
Adjusted R-squared 0.734 
*p<0.05    **p<0.1 
No. of observations 108 
 
The same procedure as previously discussed for the first regression, was applied for the next 
regression. The results from the Hausman test indicate again that random effects should be used. 
As Table 4.2.3 suggests, the p-value of 0.41 does not make it possible to reject the null 
hypothesis.  
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Table 4.2.3: Hausman test (Hypothesis 1, Regression 2) 
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 5.061629 5 0.4084 
After running the regression with random effects, the obtained Durbin Watson value was of 1.98 
which is acceptable. Lagging the dependent variable results in a value of 2.45 which is not 
desirable. Therefore taking heteroskedasticity into account by using White cross-section 
coefficient covariance matrix, the results from Table 4.2.4 were obtained.  
The second regression can be used to clarify which components of corporate governance drive 
the unexpected result described in the previous part. Focusing on the corporate governance 
indicators, there are three components correlated with investment with significant p-values (cg1, 
cg2 and cg5). Although the indicators cg3 and cg6 show negative correlation with the levels of 
investment, they are not statistically significant for the underlying countries. The result of 
negative correlation between investment and the corporate governance index in regression 1 can 
be explained by the significant negative magnitude of: cg1 (ensuring the basis for an effective 
corporate governance framework), cg2 (shareholder rights) and cg5 (disclosure and 
transparency). As a result, the indicators represented by cg1, cg2 and cg5 are those driving the 
negative correlation between investment and corporate governance index in Regression 1. The 
only indicator with a positive coefficient is cg4 (the role of the stakeholders within corporate 
governance) which is outweighed by the previous four, hence the negative coefficient. When it 
comes to the other explanatory variables, the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita has a 
positive coefficient at a statistically significant level. This is supported by theory and other 
studies (Franzini, 2009) that investment levels and GDP have a positive relationship. The 
corporate governance effectiveness is positively correlated with investment levels, as this result 
is consistent to the findings from Regression 1. Another significant explanatory variable is price 
liberalization which has a p-value of 0.033 and is positively correlated with investment.  
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Table 4.2. 4: Regression results for Hypothesis 1, Regression 2 (Investment is the dep. variable). 
 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob. 
CG1 -43.29556 27.73373 -1.56112 0.061** 
CG2 0.139468 16.97355 0.00822 0.087** 
CG3 -6.335943 21.486 -0.29489 0.384 
CG4 4.821319 15.55776 0.309898 0.379 
CG5 -21.47228 9.67226 -2.21999 0.014* 
CG6 -6.715556 17.53479 -0.38299 0.351 
CGEFFEC 3.696641 2.722244 1.357939 0.089** 
LEGALOR -0.578798 2.188918 -0.26442 0.396 
LENDRATE -0.213365 0.054316 -3.92818 0.000* 
LGDP 5.722684 0.974377 5.87317 0.000* 
LIBER 10.97104 5.891454 1.862196 0.033* 
MGROW 0.03993 0.018089 2.20739 0.015* 
PRIVATIZATION -0.115957 0.165439 -0.70091 0.242 
REGION2 4.59371 3.054249 1.504039 0.068** 
REGION3 7.11036 6.387946 1.11309 0.134 
REGION4 9.000856 5.392617 1.669107 0.049* 
Adj. R-squared 0.4 
*p<0.05; **p<0.1 
No. of Obs. 133 
The regional dummy variable included in the regression appears to have quite explanatory power 
as well, with countries in regions  2 and 4 faring better in terms of investment than their 
counterparts in region 1 (The Balkans) at statistically significant levels. 
The interest rate (lendrate) as expected is negatively correlated to the investment levels, and this 
simple relationship is logical as higher interest rate would negatively affect the levels of 
investment. The results show that the variable legal origin has almost no explanatory power, 
which is consistent with La Porta et al.’s finding that there is no much difference in corporate 
governance between economies whose commercial code is based on German or French-civil law 
(Mark. J Roe, 2000). Money growth is significant and positively correlated with investment 
while privatization besides its trivial coefficient, is statistically insignificant, so we cannot draw 
any inferences about the relationship between privatization and investment in the underlying 
sample of countries. 
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4.2.2 Analysis 
As previously mentioned, the first two regressions exhibit interesting results that go against 
theory but are consistent with Franzini (2009). The findings of the first regression suggest that 
more extensive corporate governance does not contribute to higher levels of investment in the 
CEE countries.  
An independent variable that has a positive correlation with investment and is significant, is 
’’shareholder rights’’ which would suggest that increased protection of the shareholders leads to 
higher levels of investment. This section of the survey includes questions that deal with the 
transparency of the board’s activities and the shareholders’ awareness towards any changes in 
the firm, whether they are of a capital or voting nature. Nevertheless it is unclear why 
’’transparency and disclosure’’ have the opposite effect on investment. Golebiowska-Tataj and 
Klonowski (2009) state that disclosure of information regarding the financial situation of the 
company would act as an incentive for investors and classify this as a necessary principle in 
developing countries. Therefore the first corporate governance principle in CEE is violated 
according to earlier findings.  
A possible explanation can be justified by the fact that the survey containing the corporate 
governance groups, was carried out in 2007 and is therefore used as a proxy for the time period 
2003-2009. The lack of time varying data can decrease the accuracy of the findings. Franzini 
(2009) uses the same approach for a longer period and results in a similar outcome.   
When looking at the reliability of the study, most of the control variables behave according the 
literature with data collected from EBRD which is a source that has previously been used in such 
studies and therefore can be considered as trustworthy. Furthermore, the results of this paper are 
in line with those of Franzini (2009), with the exception of some small variations. This proves 
that the paper has credibility and the source of the negative correlation between investment and 
corporate governance could be due to the exclusion of other factors such as ownership 
concentration.  
Throughout the paper it has been discussed the role of ownership concentration for effective 
corporate governance. Table 2.4 indicates that large block-holders are an important mechanism 
in CEE countries. Unfortunately this data is difficult to obtain and not available for many of the 
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countries included in the sample. Concentrated ownership is a remedy for poor corporate 
governance and it assures that the rights of outside investors will be protected (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 2012). Franzini (2009) points out that there is a negative correlation between 
concentrated ownership and corporate governance. If this is true then it can account as a main 
driver behind this paper’s findings. Thus, how extensive corporate governance regulations are 
may have less explanatory power than the ownership structure factor. This leaves room for future 
studies that extend the present model by adding ownership.    
Two variables that lack any explanatory power are privatization and legal origin (in the second 
regression). In fact Johnson and Shleifer (2004) establish a connection between the two control 
variables by stating that the origin of a country’s legal system can have a significant impact on 
the exploitation of the benefits of privatization.  
Rejecting the null from Hypothesis 1, leads to the conclusion that there is a discrepancy between 
corporate governance in theory and in practice. There is a debate among scholars regarding the 
efficient implementation of corporate governance in CEE countries and what policies are 
appropriate for such regions. 
4.3 Hypothesis II 
Below are presented the regressions used for testing the first hypothesis, where the subscript “t” 
indicates a time-changing variable, while “i” denotes a changeable variable across countries.   
Regression 3: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9log
i i i it it
it it it i
GDP cgindex cgeffec legor privatiz pricelib
gdp mgr lendr reg
     
    
      
   
 
Regression 4: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13
14
1 2 3 4 5 6
log
i i i i i i i
i it it it it it
i
GDP cg cg cg cg cg cg cgeffec
legor privatiz pricelib gdp mgr lendr
reg
       
     
 
        
     

 
35 
 
4.3.1 Findings  
As previously elaborated, the Hausman test is run first in order to determine whether fixed or 
random effects are more relevant for the underlying model. The following table showcases the 
result of the test. 
Table 4.3.1: Hausman test (Hypothesis 2, Regression 1) 
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 3.543660 5 0.6168 
 
The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that we need to use random effects, while the 
alternative suggests for fixed effects. Since the p-value is higher than 0.05 we cannot reject H0 
and can therefore infer that the random effects is more suitable for the underlying regression. 
Checking for autocorrelation can be done by observing the relevant Durbin Watson statistic. The 
DW statistic indicates a value of 1.83 which suggests some form of a positive correlation. To 
correct for this, we lag the dependent variable (GDP growth) by one period and run another 
regression. Finally, the White cross-section coefficient covariance matrix is used to account for 
possible heteroskedasticity. The new value of the Durbin Watson statistic suggests a better model 
as the new value is 1.93.  
The results from Hypothesis 2, regression 1, are shown in Table 4.3.2 which indicates that there 
are seven out of eleven variables that have significant coefficients. As in hypothesis 1, the 
corporate governance index and effectiveness are both significant with a p-value of 0.05 and 
0.08. Also the direction of the relationship between these independent variables and GDP is 
negative for the corporate governance index and positive for the effectiveness index which was 
expected after the findings from regression 1, hypothesis 1. The next three variables, 
privatization, legal origin and ln of GDP, all show a negative relationship with the GDP growth 
rate which is surprising especially when it comes to the latter. Nevertheless their coefficients do 
not have any explanatory power as suggested by their p-values which are greater than 0.1. Price 
liberalization and money growth, both show a positive correlation with the dependent variable 
and have significant p-values of 0.032 and 0.038. Although literature would suggest money 
growth to have a negative correlation with the GDP growth rate, Franzini (2009) also finds a 
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positive correlation. The variable lending rate has a negative and significant coefficient with a p-
value of 0.001 and therefore exhibits a behavior predicted by theory.   
Table 4. 3.2: Regression results for Hypothesis 2, Regression 1 (GDP growth rate is the 
dependent variable) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob. 
CGINDEX -0.95225 0.591487 -1.60993 0.055* 
CGEFFEC 0.809592 0.58701 1.379179 0.0852* 
LEGOR -0.03986 0.285567 -0.13957 0.4446 
LENDR -0.20775 0.135487 -1.53336 0.0639* 
LOGDP -0.35783 0.800226 -0.44716 0.3278 
PRICELIB 1.873583 0.940144 1.992868 0.02425* 
MGROW 0.036894 0.019088 1.932825 0.0278* 
PRIVATIZ -0.05104 0.045325 -1.1261 0.1312 
REG2 1.787174 0.539803 3.31079 0.0006* 
REG3 1.796166 2.026883 0.886172 0.18865 
REG4 3.647835 1.56373 2.332778 0.01065* 
Adjusted R-squared 0.214 
*p<0.05    **p<0.1 
No. of observations 108 
 
The dummy variables included in the regression, regions 2 and 4 have positive coefficients and 
are significant at 5%. The adjusted R-squared has a higher value of this regression, which 
indicates a slightly better predictability power than the first regression from hypothesis 1.  
The same procedure is used for the second regression. The output from the Hausman test points 
out that random effects should be used again. As the following table shows, the p-value of 0.71 
does not make it possible to reject the null so random effects are used again. Finally, the Durbin 
Watson value is 1.975 which is close to 2 and therefore acceptable. 
Table 4.3.3: Hausman test (Hypothesis 2, Regression 2) 
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 2.897753 5 0.7157 
 
Table 4.3.4 contains the results of the last regression, where the relationship between the GDP 
growth and 16 explanatory variables is observed. The fourth regression is used to decompose the 
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effect of individual corporate governance indicators on GDP growth. In the underlying 
regression, 3 corporate governance components are correlated with GDP growth at statistically 
significant levels: cg1 (ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework), cg5 
(disclosure and transparency) and cg2 (shareholder rights). Franzini (2009) also finds a negative 
correlation between cg1 and GDP growth rate for selected European countries at a statistically 
significant level. The corporate governance effectiveness variable, similarly as the previous 
results, displays a positive relationship with GDP growth at a significant level. The privatization 
variable and the legal origin of the countries within the sample, have very negligible coefficients 
which both do not show any statistical significance. A significant explanatory variable is price 
liberalization that has a p-value of 0.06 and is positively correlated with the GDP growth. 
Furthermore, the results showcase the insignificance of the natural logarithm of GDP. The 
interest rate (lendrate) displays a negative correlation to the GDP growth at a statistically 
significant level. A decrease in the interest rate will result in a higher GDP growth.  
Table 4.3.4: Regression results for Hypothesis 2, Regression 2 (GDP growth rate is the 
dependent variable) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob. 
CG1 -7.92194 5.959036 -1.3294 0.09315** 
CG2 6.486114 3.392463 1.911919 0.0292* 
CG3 -1.83383 3.057552 -0.59977 0.2749 
CG4 -2.01348 1.714123 -1.17464 0.12125 
CG5 -6.20784 2.722139 -2.2805 0.0122* 
CG6 -1.77953 3.024332 -0.5884 0.2787 
CGEFFEC 0.725055 0.641112 1.130933 0.0902** 
LEGALORIGIN 0.376655 0.498298 0.755882 0.22565 
LENDRATE -0.21096 0.129518 -1.62881 0.05305** 
LGDP -0.4174 0.838864 -0.49757 0.30985 
LIBER 1.754422 1.090265 1.60917 0.05515** 
MGROW 0.028271 0.020897 1.352865 0.08935** 
PRIVATIZATION -0.04031 0.054205 -0.74365 0.2293 
REG2 2.102046 0.86548 2.428763 0.00835* 
REG3 2.267094 1.989196 1.139703 0.1284 
REG4 4.739892 1.587543 2.985678 0.00175* 
Adj. R-squared 0.223735 
*p<0.05; **p<0.1 
No. of Obs. 133 
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The dummy variables included in the regression (Region 2 and Region 4) have positive 
coefficients and are statistically significant with p<.01. These results imply that Regions: 2 and 4 
are doing better in terms of the GDP growth compared to the Balkan and Baltic countries 
(Region 1 and 3, respectfully). Finally, the Adjusted R-Squared which points out the goodness of 
fit, which is higher than the previous regression (0.223). 
4.3.2 Analysis  
Regarding the findings for Hypothesis 2, these indicate a negative relationship between corporate 
governance breadth and GDP growth. Rejecting the null of Hypothesis 2 doesn't necessarily 
imply a surprising result. There is evidence that when a country's overall corporate governance 
system as weak, as is the case in some Eastern European countries, the underlying corporate 
governance mechanisms have limited effectiveness, i.e. they might not affect the GDP growth as 
expected. Furthermore, the negative correlation is driven by the following two corporate 
governance components: “ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework” 
and “disclosure and transparency”. Even though as previously discussed, according to theory the 
presence of a sound basis of corporate governance and transparency should increase growth.  
In addition to the six variables used to measure the extensiveness of corporate governance, 
another indicator is used in order to determine the effectiveness as well. The corporate 
governance effectiveness measures the extent to which shareholders are able to seek legal 
protection. Besides the appropriate rights all shareholders must have, they should also be willing 
to take forward their responsibility of stewardship. For instance, a region with a very extensive 
corporate governance structure may have a low effectiveness mark meaning that the investors are 
not able to use the legal framework in order to carry out their rights in practice. It is a fair 
assumption that effective corporate governance helps to underpin market confidence, financial 
stability and thus overall growth (Warring, 2009). 
The positive correlation between GDP growth and price liberalization is expected and supported 
by theory. There are various channels through which liberalization may affect growth. To begin 
with, foreign investors, enjoying better diversification benefits, will increase local equity prices 
permanently resulting in lower cost of capital (Bekaert & Harvey, 2001). Henry (2000) shows 
evidence that the cost of capital is reduced after big regulatory reforms. Furthermore, there is 
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now a substantial literature on how financial liberalization may promote overall development 
(Love, 2000). Harvey and Bekaert (2009) conduct a study and find that financial liberalization 
alone contributes 30% of the total increased growth.  
The money supply growth in our sample is represented either by M2 or M3 depending on the 
availability of data regarding the countries in the sample. The results show a positive relation 
between the money growth and GDP growth. The validity of this outcome is both expected, and 
supported by theory. Liang & Huang (2011) study the relationship between money supply and 
GDP and conduct a qualitative and quantitative analysis by adopting M2 money supply and GDP 
measuring economic performance. The underlying analysis indicates that a change of M2 will 
trigger a change in GDP, a result that is in line with the output from our regression. 
Finally, the interest rate as an independent variable is statistically significant with a negative 
coefficient, which supports the theoretical founding that GDP growth and interest rates show a 
slight negative correlation. D'Adda & Scorcu's (1997) paper on this topic points out that that the 
effect of a 1% increase in the real interest rate leads to a fall of 0.35% in the growth rate for the 
average of the European countries over the period 1965-1994. This finding is consistent to the 
negative correlation in Central and Eastern European countries included in the sample. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper sought to describe and analyze the connection between investment, GDP growth and 
corporate governance in theory and in practice. The presented literature introduces the reader 
first by discussing corporate governance from a general setting and then by focusing solely on 
mechanisms and principles in CEE countries. 
The findings of the paper negate some of the preliminary anticipations regarding the effect of 
corporate governance on investment and GDP growth. After testing the hypotheses, there was 
found a negative correlation between the dependent variables and corporate governance. The 
common drivers of this negative correlation in both regressions are the following corporate 
governance groups: “ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework” and 
“disclosure and transparency”. Although the literature would predict the opposite, a speculated 
reasoning behind these results is the omission of other corporate governance factors such as 
ownership structure that are difficult to obtain data on. On the other hand, most control variables 
behave as expected and predicted by literature which increases the reliability of the study.  
The negative correlation between both, GDP growth, Investment and Corporate Governance 
might be explained by contemplating the issues of corporate governance. The inefficiency of 
corporate governance in the selected countries in Central and Eastern Europe might be due to 
(Bobirca & Miclaus, 2007): 
-the perseverance of the problem of soft budget constraints, along with the difficulty of securing 
external financing.  
-the remaining impact of the country over corporate decision-making through a network of tax 
arrears, subsidies and administrative favors provided in exchange for residual managing and 
controlling rights 
-weak minority-investor protection, along with entrenched positions of binding managers, who 
remain in control despite that privatization had transferred ownership to outsiders 
-Substantial dependency on banks, undeveloped capital markets and high debt/equity ratios. 
-Concentration of ownership negatively affects the liquidity of equity markets.  
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The inefficient corporate governance in the selected countries can also be explained with the 
weaker legal systems and corruption. Naturally, there are differences in the magnitude of these 
issues depending on the state. Court delays, which can be used as a measure of contract 
enforceability are higher in Civil Law countries than in Common Law Countries (Djankov, 
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2003). The majority of Central and Eastern 
European economies have adopted a Civil Law System. Furthermore, according to the World 
Bank (2006), Central and Eastern European countries generally belong to the group with quite 
high court delays (especially Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). These court 
delays naturally increase the cost of using courts in order to find a resolution to a conflict. 
Corruption is also a substantial issue that affects the corporate governance efficiency in the 
region (Bobirca & Miclaus, 2007). According to the "Corruption Percentage Index" (CPI) 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe are significantly more corrupt (or, seen as corrupt by 
market participants) compared to the other European Countries. 
One of the most important inferences from this paper is that there is a weak corporate 
governance framework in most countries included in the sample. According to (Bobirca & 
Miclaus, 2007) the corporate governance framework cannot be solved only by radical 
improvements. The development of the law system does not go hand in hand with the 
development of financial markets. This anomaly is due to the ineffective law institutions, which 
shape up the term "effectiveness".  
In their research of finance and law around the world, LLSV (1998) show that effective law 
enforcement is not a substitute for the poor laws on the books. The reverse holds for the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe: the existence of laws cannot replace weak institutions. 
Finally this paper could serve as a platform for future studies. An extended model could explain 
the current findings in more depth by adding additional factors that describe and measure the 
relationship between investment, GDP growth and corporate governance.     
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Appendix A: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables including cg_index 
  Cg_index Money 
Growth 
LGDP Liberalization Lending 
rate 
Privatization Efficiency Legal 
Origin 
Cg_index 1        
Money 
Growth 
-0.38995 1       
LGDP 0.582217 -0.37202 1      
Liberalization 0.530002 -0.25956 0.385673 1     
Lending rate -0.221 0.410294 -0.52829 -0.04728 1    
Privatization 0.289032 -0.02825 0.121099 0.298739 0.294521 1   
Efficiency 0.617277 -0.12646 0.424013 0.416804 -0.01259 0.211979 1  
Legal Origin 0.281557 -0.3148 0.53467 0.173927 -0.29835 0.196105 0.195419 1 
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Appendix B: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables including corporate governance 
groups 
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